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We develop a simple information-based model of FDI flows. On the one hand, the abundance of
"intangible" capital in specialized industries in the source countries, which presumably generates
expertise in screening investment projects in the host countries, enhances FDI flows. On the other
hand, host-country corporate-transparency diminishes the value of this expertise, thereby reducing
the flow of FDI. Empirical evidence (from a sample of 12 source countries and 45 host countries
over the 1980s and 1990s) analyzed in a gravity-equation model, provides support to the theoretical
hypotheses.
The model also demonstrates that the gains for the host country from foreign direct investment [over
foreign portfolio investment (FPI)] are reflected in a more efficient size of the stock of domestic
capital and its allocation across firms. These gains are shown to depend crucially (and positively)
on the degree of competition among FDI investors.
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The model also demonstrates that the gains for the host country from foreign direct 
investment [over foreign portfolio investment (FPI)] are reflected in a more efficient size of 
the stock of domestic capital and its allocation across firms. These gains are shown to depend 
crucially (and positively) on the degree of competition among FDI investors. 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been growing faster than world GDP, and is becoming a 
major component of foreign investment.
2 We usually observe both one-way flows of FDI, 
from developed to developing economies, and two-way flows among developed economies. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore some unique features of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) associated with host-country transparency and source-country specialization, that make 
this form of foreign investment stand out among the various forms of capital flows, such as 
foreign portfolio investment (FPI). 
 
From empirical data (a sample of 12 source countries and 45 host countries over the 1980s 
and the 1990s) we identify two main categories of variables that help explain FDI inflows. 
First, we uncover a positive correlation between industry specialization in the source 
countries and FDI flows into the host countries. Second, we find that countries with higher 
quality of corporate transparencies, and stronger credit-market institutions, attract less FDI 
inflows. 
                                                 
2 See the Australian Productivity Commission (2002) for a recent case study.   - 3 - 
 
 
We incorporate these new theoretical considerations in a gravity model of capital flows. Such 
models have proved useful in explaining bilateral trade flows and, more recently, cross-
border equity flows (Portes and Rey, 2000 and Portes, Rey and Oh, 2001). There have been 
some initial explorations of the determinants of FDI in gravity models (Wei, 2000), but the 
focus has not been on the role of corporate-governance information, as we do here. 
 
We first develop a simple information-based model, consistent with the empirical findings 
concerning specialization and transparency. We interpret the industry specialization in the 
source country as providing a comparative advantage to the potential foreign direct investors, 
in eliciting good investment opportunities in the host country, relative to domestic investors 
and foreign portfolio investors in the host country. The advantage stems, for instance, from 
the ability of FDI investors to apply better industry-specific micro-management standards (an 
“intangible capital”). This element is captured in our model by assuming a lower cost for 
foreign direct investors of cream-skimming high-productivity firms than their domestic 
counterparts. The advantage of FDI investors in their cream-skimming skills is less 
pronounced when corporate transparency and capital market institutions are of high quality; 
in which case FDI inflows are less abundant.
3 
 
Our model also suggests that the gains from FDI to the host country are reflected in a more 
efficient size of the stock of domestic capital and its allocation across firms. Domestic firms 
that are controlled by FDI investors are typically the “cream" (high-productivity firms). The 
                                                 
3 See also Razin and Sadka (2003).   - 4 - 
 
magnitude of these non-traditional gains from trade that arise in our model depends crucially 
(and inversely) on the degree of competition among potential FDI investors over the 
domestic firms. These gains can shrink to zero if there is no such competition altogether. 
Also, FDI inflows could make the size of the aggregate stock of domestic capital larger than 
otherwise (under plausible assumptions). This result is consistent with recent empirical 
evidence. For instance, Borenzstein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998) and Bosworth and Collins 
(1999) provide such evidence for a sample of developing countries during the period 1978-
1995. More recently, in a sample of developing countries, Razin (forthcoming), finds that the 
effect of FDI inflows on domestic investment is significantly larger than either FPI or loan 
inflows (Appendix 1, Table 1). He also provides evidence that FDI inflows promote 
efficiency: The effect of FDI on GDP growth is higher than the effect of other inflows, after 
controlling for domestic capital accumulation (Appendix 1, Table 2). 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops a simple information-based 
model, which emphasizes the role of host-country transparency and source-country industry 
specialization in explaining the determinants of FDI and FPI flows. Section 3 compares the 
benefits for the host-country from receiving FDI inflows instead of FPI inflows. Section 4 
confronts the theory with evidence by applying the gravity equation approach. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
II.   FDI AND SKIMMING HIGH-PRODUCTIVITY FIRMS 
Assume a large number (N) of ex-ante identical domestic firms in an industry. Each firm 
employs capital input (K), in the first period, in order to produce a single composite good in 
the second period. As usual, we assume that capital depreciates at the rate δ (< 1). Output in   - 5 - 
 
the second period is equal to F (K)(1+ ε), where F (∙) is a production function, which 
exhibits diminishing marginal productivity of capital (ε bounded below by  –1) so that output 
is always non-negative. For notational ease we also assume that ε is bounded from above by 
1. Suppose that ε is purely idiosyncratic, so that there is no aggregate uncertainty in the 
model. Consumers-investors are well diversified and will thus behave in a risk-neutral way. 
We denote by G(∙) the cumulative distribution function of ε, and by g(∙) =  (.) G′  the 
corresponding density function. 
 
At the starting point of the decision process of agents in the first period, the productivity 
factor (ε) of each firm is not revealed with full accuracy. Rather, each firm receives a signal 
ε′about its productivity, which is common knowledge.
4 The true ε  of the firm is within an 
interval of ±β aroundε′. Formally, given ε′ the true value of ε  is distributed according to 
the distribution of the productivity factor, conditional on its being in the interval 
() , β ε β ε + ′ − ′ , the conditional distribution is: 
) ( ) (
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The conditional distribution  ) ( ε ε ϕ ′ ′ denotes the cumulative distribution function ofε , 
conditional on the signal ε′. We assume that the signal ε′ is distributed according to the 
distribution function G(∙).  
                                                 
4 One can think of this signal as sort of encapsulated information, provided by up-to-date 
financial statements.   - 6 - 
 
The firm chooses the level of the capital stock (and investment), denoted by ) (ε′ K , after the 
signalε′is received, so as to maximize its conditional (onε′) expected market value. This 
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Symbol δ  is the rate of depreciation,
5
0 ) 1 ( K δ −  is the initial stock of capital, and r is the 
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This expression can be simplified to: 
 
[ ] δ ε ε ε + = ′ + ′ ′ r E K F )] / ( 1 [ ) ( ,     (3) 
 
where ) / ( ε ε ′ E  is the conditional expected value of the productivity factor, given that this 
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Suppose that there is a screening (or search) technology, which, at some fixed cost per firm, 
can elicit the true value of the productivity factor of the firm,ε . A potential buyer can apply 
the technology after she acquires the firms and gains control of the domestic firm. We 
                                                 
5 Because of the assumption that there is a single composite good, which serves both for 
investment and for consumption, we implicitly allow the optimal K to be above ( 0 ) 1 K δ − .   - 7 - 
 
assume that foreign direct investors have a cutting-edge advantage over domestic investors in 
extracting information about the true value of the firm. If foreign direct investors acquire a 
domestic firm, they can apply their superior micro-management skills in order to elicit the 
true value ofε . This advantage stems from some sort of  “intangible capital" (specialized 
knowledge) in this particular industry. The basic idea is that firms get involved in foreign 
operations in order to exploit this unique advantage that they have accumulated over time in 
their source country. The advantage is modeled here by specifying a lower screening cost for 
foreign direct investors than for domestic investors. Formally, the cost per firm for a foreign 
direct investor is CF , which is assumed to be lower than CD, the corresponding cost for a 
domestic direct investor (i.e., a domestic investor who gains acquires control of the domestic 
firm).  
 
If the true value ofε  were to be known, then the firm would choose an optimal capital stock, 
denoted by ) ( * ε K , according to the marginal productivity condition: 
 
[ ] δ ε ε + = + ′ r K F ) 1 ( ) ( *       ( 5 )  
 
Given the signalε′, a potential foreign direct investor knows that the true value of ε  must lie 
between  β ε − ′ and  β ε + ′ , and that she will be able to elicit the true value of ε  if she 
purchases the firm, at a cost CF . Therefore, her gross bid price, given the signalε′, is 
described by: 
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Her net bid price is F C P − ′) (ε . Because CF is smaller than CD, the bid price of the foreign 
direct investor is higher than that of the domestic investor. 
 
Given the signal ε′, the value of information to the FDI investor (that is, the value of 
eliciting the true productivity of the firm) is ) ( ) ( ε ε ′ − ′ V P . The associated cost is CF . In 
order to incur this cost, the value of information must exceed this cost. Naturally, one would 
expect the value of information to rise withε′. This is because, given the signal ε′, the 
deviations of the productivity–independent  ) (ε′ K over the interval  ) , ( β ε β ε + ′ − ′ , from the 
productivity–dependent ) ( * ε K over this interval and, consequently, the deviations of 
)) ( * ( ε′ K F from over this interval, are magnified by the productivity factor 1+ε . We 
therefore assume indeed that  ) ( ) ( ε ε ′ − ′ V P rises withε′.
6 Hence, there exists some cutoff 
level of the signal, denoted by  0 ε′ , such that for all 0 ε ε ′ < ′ , the bid-ask price 
difference ) ( ) ( ε ε ′ − − ′ V C P F is negative, and, similarly, for all 0 ε ε ′ > ′ , the bid-ask price 
difference is positive. Thus, all the firms that receive a low-productivity signal will be 
retained by the original (domestic) owners, and all the firms that receive a high-productivity 
signal will be acquired by foreign direct investors, who manage to outbid their domestic 
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0 0 C V C C P ε ε = − ′       ( 7 )  
                                                 
6 Indeed, Ariel Burstein (2003) provided us with an illuminating numerical example in which 
the bid–ask price difference rises with ε′, as expected.   - 9 - 
 
 
With FDI investors who can do the screening at a cost CF per firm, the cutoff level of the 
signal is a function of ) ( 0 0 F F C ε ε ′ ≡ ′ . 
 
The assumption that  ) ( ) ( ε ε ′ − ′ V P rises withε′implies also that as the screening cost ( CF ) 
of the FDI investors falls, the cutoff productivity level (that is,  F 0 ε′ ) declines with CF, as 
well. This means that with a fall in CF  more firms will be acquired by FDI investors. 
Therefore, a lower screening cost of FDI investors gives rise to a larger volume of FDI 
inflows.
7 By the same token, as the signal becomes more accurate (that is, as β becomes 
smaller), the benefit of the screening technology, which is ) ( ) ( ε ε ′ − ′ V P , declines. We 
interpret a more accurate signal as an improvement in corporate transparency.  The advantage 
of FDI investors in their cream-skimming skills is less pronounced when host-country 
corporate transparency improves,
8 and FDI inflows are expected to be less abundant.  
 
After the signals are revealed, then a firm with a signalε′, below F 0 ε′ , actually adjusts its 
capital stock to the signal-dependent, productivity-independent level ) (ε K . But a firm, which 
receives a signalε′ above F 0 ε′ , expects to adjust its capital stock to a productivity-dependent 
level ) ( * ε K with a cumulative distributionfunction  ) / ( ε ε ϕ ′ . The expected value of its 
capital stock, denoted by  ] / ) ( * [ ε ε ′ K E  is given by: 
                                                 
7 We refer to the sum of the acquisition price of the firm and the investment in its capacity 
(that is financed by the FDI owner) as FDI inflows. 
8 Indeed, these results also hold in Burstein’s (2003) example, albeit with a different 





− ′ ′ = ′
β ε
β ε ε ε ϕ ε ε ε ) / ( ) ( * ] / ) ( * [ d K K E   .    (8) 
 




− ′ ′ ′ + ′ ′ =
F
F




) ( ] / ) ( * [ ) ( ) (
ε
ε ε ε ε ε ε     (9) 
 
This is our measure of the size of domestic capital. 
III.   FPI INFLOWS VERSUS FDI INFLOWS 
To understand the unique role of FDI, suppose now that instead of FDI inflows there are only 
FPI inflows. That is, assume that the world rate of interest (rate of return) continues to prevail 
in the home country. Management under FDI ownership, however, may be plagued by the 
notorious "free-rider" problem. As noted succinctly by Oliver Hart (2000), “If the 
shareholder does something to improve the quality of management, then the benefits will be 
enjoyed by all shareholders. Unless the shareholder is altruistic, she will ignore this 
beneficial impact on other shareholders and so will under-invest in the activity of monitoring 
or improving management." To capture this argument in our case, we simply assume that FPI 




In this case, direct domestic investors acquire and gain control of the firms with high-
productivity signals. Domestic and FPI investors will be forced to acquire all the other firms 
with low-productivity signals. The cutoff level of the signal in this case is ). ( 0 0 D D C ε ε ′ ≡ ′  
                                                 
9 In this paper we do not distinguish between foreign and domestic portfolio investors. For an 
analysis of information asymmetry between these two types of investors, which leads to the 
home-bias phenomenon in portfolio investment, see Razin, Sadka, and Yuen (1998).   - 11 - 
 
Because CD  > CF , it follows that  D F 0 0 ε ε ′ < ′  [recall that ) ( ) ( ε ε ′ − ′ V P is increasing in ε′, by 
assumption, and see equation (7)]. Thus, the difference in investment in capacity between the 
two regimes lies only in the range of signals between  F 0 ε′  and  D 0 ε′ . The capital stock of a 
firm with a signal below  F 0 ε′  is the same in the two regimes. The expected capital stock of a 
firm with a signal above D 0 ε′  will also be the same in the two regimes. But a firm, which 
receives a signalε′in-between these two cutoff levels, will invest a signal-dependent  ) ' (ε K  
in the foreign portfolio-investment regime compared to a productivity-dependent 
schedule, ) ( * ε K , with a cumulative distribution  ) / ( ε ε ϕ ′ , in the FDI regime. Naturally, the 
latter is more efficient, in the sense that it yields a higher expected return.
10 
 
A.   Gains to the Host Country 
The economic gains from FDI, relative to FPI inflows, consist of the efficiency of investment 
and the lower screening cost of FDI investors. Note that because the same world interest rate, 
r, prevails in the home country in the two regimes, it follows that the gains from FDI in our 
case do not include the traditional gains from opening up the domestic capital market to 
foreign capital inflows. (Evidently, these traditional gains are present also in the portfolio 
regime.) In the FDI-flow regime the firms with signals above the cutoff signal F 0 ε′  are 
screened; whereas in the FPI-flow regime a smaller set of firms, namely only the firms with 
                                                 
10 We have assumed that the only advantage of FDI investors over direct domestic investors 
lies in the search/screening cost. Naturally, if we were to assume that FDI investors can also 
obtain better information about the true ε (we have assumed that both can accurately elicit ε), 
then the difference between the two regimes expands to the entire range of [-1, 1] of signals. 
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0 F D ε ε > . Therefore, the gains to the host country 
stemming from the efficiency of investment is: 
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In addition, for the firms that are screened in the two regimes (that is, the firms with signals 
above D 0 ε′ , the screening cost is lower under the FDI regime than under the portfolio flow 
regime. This gives rise to further gains from FDI, which are: 
 
)] ( 1 )[ ( 0D F D C G C C GAIN ε′ − − = .            (11) 
 
Observe that the entire gain, attributable to the lower screening cost of FDI investors is 
captured by the host country because of the assumed perfect competition among the FDI 
investors over the domestic firms. This is because competition among FDI investors must 
drive up the price they pay for a domestic firm to their net bid-price [that is,  F C P − ′) (ε ], 
which exceeds the ask-price of the domestic owners [that is,  )] (ε′ V ; except for the cutoff 
firm (for which the bid price and ask price are equal to each other). Thus, the total gain to the 
host country from FDI is 
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Note, however, that in the extreme opposite case of a single FDI investor, a monopoly, she 
will never offer a price for a domestic firm above the price that will be offered by domestic 
investors, which is D C P − ′) (ε , as long as this price is above, or equal, to the ask price of the   - 13 - 
 
domestic owner, which is  ). (ε′ V  Thus, the price at which the foreign direct investor buys a 
domestic firm with a signalε′is  )]. ( , ) ( [ ε ε ′ − ′ V C P Max D  Because  ), ( ) ( 0 0 D D D V C P ε ε ′ = − ′  it 
follows that  ) ( ) ( ε ε ′ < − ′ V C P D in the interval  ). , ( 0 0 D F ε ε ′ ′  This means that in this interval the 
domestic firms are purchased by the foreign direct investor at the ask price  ). (ε′ V  Hence, the 
efficiency gain of investment, GAINE, vanishes. Similarly, firms in the interval  ] 1 , [ OD ε′  must 
be purchased at the price D C P − ′) (ε [rather than  F C P − ′) (ε  in the competitive case]. Hence, 
GAINC vanishes as well. Thus, as expected, the entire gain from FDI accrues to the single 
FDI investor. To retain some of the gains of FDI a possible remedy for the host country is to 
impose some sort of a floor to the sale prices of domestic firms. Another partial remedy for 
the host country is to impose a (source-based) capital gains tax on FDI investors. In the 
intermediate case of imperfect competition among a few FDI investors but not a strict 
monopoly, the gains from FDI are split between the host country and the FDI investors
11. 
 
B.   The Size of Investment in Capacity in the Host Country 
We have already established that the allocation of the capital stock (its aggregate level and 
distribution over firms) is more efficient in the FDI regime than in the portfolio regime. Is the 
capital stock also larger in the FDI regime than in the FPI regime? Recall that the 
fundamental difference between the two regimes is the screening cost C. Therefore, 
rephrasing the question one can ask whether a decline in the search cost increases the 
                                                 
11 Evidently this is an extreme case. If there is an additional domestic input, say labor, the 
host country still gains, even in the case of a single FDI investor, through infra-marginal 
gains to domestic labor. However, these gains are sharply smaller than what they could have 
been in the case of competitive FDI investors.   - 14 - 
 
aggregate stock of capital. In order to answer the question, we write the aggregate stock of 
capital as a function of C, as follows [see equation (9)]: 
 













dG K E dG K C K
ε
ε
ε ε ε ε ε           (13) 
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From equations (3) and (5) we can conclude that: 
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If  H(·)  is convex, then it follows from Jensen’s inequality that  dC dK/
−
is negative (because 
0 / 0 > ′ dC dε ). Indeed, one may plausibly assume that H is convex (for instance, this is the   - 15 - 
 
case with a Cobb-Douglas production function), in which case  0 / <
−
dC dK . That is: The size 
of investment in capacity is larger under the regime of FDI inflows than under the regime of 
FPI inflows. 
 
IV.   EVIDENCE FROM A GRAVITY MODEL 
In this section we confront our theoretical findings with evidence provided by a gravity 
model of bilateral FDI and FPI flows. The econometric model attempts to explain the 
determinants of the mobility of FDI and FPI across countries.  We use a gravity model as a 
“platform” to test the role of information in attracting FDI from a source country to the host 
country. 
 
Gravity models postulate that bilateral international flows (goods, FDI, etc.) between any two 
economies are positively related to the size of the two economies (e.g., population, GDP), 




The “gravity” control variables we use are: source and host country populations as measures 
of country scale, source and host country per capita incomes to represent their level of 
economic development, distance as a proxy for transportation costs (and, possibly “cultural 
distance”), and an instrumented measure of bilateral telephone traffic to represent bilateral 
                                                 
12 For instance, using population as the size variable, Loungani, Mody and Razin (2002) find 
that imports are less than proportionately related to the host country population, while they 
are close to proportionately related to the source country population. Correspondingly, FDI 
flows increase by more than proportionately with both the source and the host-country 
populations.   - 16 - 
 
communication capability. The volume of international trade in goods and services can 
naturally be associated with FDI flows (and perhaps also with FPI flows). For instance, 
vertical FDI flows by multinationals are usually related to more trade in intermediate goods; 
similarly, horizontal FDI flows are typically related to less trade in final goods. Therefore, 
we introduce goods trade into the FDI and FPI equations. 
 
To the traditional gravity variables, we add variables suggested by our theory. Recall that the 
theory we develop suggests that, although the lack of transparency hurts investment in a 
country, nevertheless foreign direct investors may be able to overcome, and even gain from 
this disadvantage, on account of their superior ability to screen and monitor the acquired firm 
and, thereby, making efficient investments. These theoretical considerations lead us to search 
for variables that are available in the data and could also serve as proxies for host country 
corporate transparency and source country industry specialization. Consider each in turn. 
 
A.   Corporate Transparency in the Host Country 
 
Our theory suggests that foreign investment will depend on the accuracy of the productivity 
signals in the host countries. The more accurate are the signals, the less pronounced is the 
advantage of FDI investors, and the less abundant are FDI flows to the host countries. This 
explanatory variable is represented in the gravity regression by two measures.  
 
The first is a measure of creditor rights taken from La Porta et al (2000). What we want to 
represent is the degree of corporate transparency that diminishes the power of the insiders (in 
eliciting the true productivity factor of the firm and employing a productivity-dependent   - 17 - 
 
investment strategy). We employ a measure of creditor rights (on a scale of one to five). We 
conjecture that such rights go hand-in-hand with corporate transparency. Our presumption is 
that creditors are on the frontline with respect to borrowers and, hence, are most influential in 
establishing borrower transparency. Accordingly, a regime of strong creditor rights will be 
associated with greater transparency.
13 To exercise their rights, creditors need to be able to 
monitor borrowers in good times and be able to assess their claims when the borrower goes 
into bankruptcy. How might we expect creditor rights to influence international trade and 
FDI?  Where superior creditor rights exist, they should boost international goods trading 
activity to the extent it relies on trade credit; in other words, where an importer is extended 
credit by its foreign supplier, the presence of strong creditor rights will enhance international 
trade in goods. In contrast, our theoretical model predicts exactly the opposite for FDI. 
Because strong creditor rights are likely to be associated with greater transparency of 
information, they will tend to reduce the advantage foreign investors enjoy on account of 
their superior inside information; stronger creditor rights tend also reduce the advantage 
enjoyed by foreign investors in financing the necessary acquisitions and new investments 
through their internal sources of funds. As creditor rights deteriorate, FDI would substitute 
for goods trade. 
                                                 
13 Others have used credit-based measures to infer transparency (or its opposite, opaqueness). 
Morgan (1999) suggests that the opaqueness of a firm is related to the extent to which rating 
agencies disagree on its credit rating (split rating).  Bonaccorsi and Dell’Ariccia 
(forthcoming) investigate the effects of competition in the financial sector on the creation of 
firms in the non-financial sector. Inter alia, they bring evidence that the quality of borrowers’ 
collateral is negatively related to opaqueness (as proxied by split-rating). At the same time 
borrowers’ collaterals are correlated with the debt-equity ratio in financing their productive 
activities.   - 18 - 
 
 
As a second measure of transparency, we construct the corporate sector’s debt-equity ratio in 
the host country, represented here by the median debt-equity ratio for the sample of firms 
covered by Worldscope. This debt-equity ratio measure has the advantage of changing over 
time, unlike the creditor rights’ variable that is unchanging. A higher debt equity ratio can be 
expected once again to reflect a stronger credit culture and hence represent another 
dimension of corporate transparency.    
 
B.   Industry Specialization in the Source Country 
A second key determinant of FDI flows in our theory is the skimming cost advantage of FDI 
investors over other foreign investors, which stems from “intangible capital” accumulated 
through industry (or niche) specialization in the source countries. The basic idea is that 
countries with a high degree of specialization are assumed to have high levels of intangible 
capital (specialized knowledge) by virtue of the fact that the productive energies of the 
source countries’ firms have been focused on a smaller number of activities/industries 
(niches), thereby better exploiting the “learning-by-doing” effects. Hence a higher degree of 
specialization in the source countries increases the cost advantage of FDI investors and is 
expected to generate more FDI flows to the host economies. We therefore include a measure 
of industry specialization (a proxy for intangible capital) in the source countries as an 
explanatory variable.  Our measure of country specialization is the degree of concentration in 
the sectoral composition of a country’s exports. An important question is: how good is our 
measure of specialization in capturing our theoretical construct. In other words, is there any 
reason to believe that countries with a high degree of specialization in exports have also an 
advantage in directly investing in foreign countries abroad in the sectors they specialize in?   - 19 - 
 
To answer this question, we compared the sectoral distribution of a country’s exports with 
the sectoral distribution FDI. We find that the null hypothesis, that the two distributions are 
the same, is almost never rejected (see Appendix II). The implication is the country’s trade 
specialization leverages the specialized skills that arise from those production and trade 
activities into outward foreign direct investment. 
 
C.   Findings 
We begin with a gravity equation for international trade in goods and services to provide a 
benchmark. We then contrast those findings to those for FDI flows, which, in turn, are 
contrasted with those for FPI flows. The dependent variable for the goods trade equation is 
the log of imports of goods and services into the host country. 
 
Three-year averages are used to smooth out idiosyncratic variations in the annual data. For 
each country pair, we have, in principle, three observations for trade and FDI inflows and 
two for equity inflows for that decade of the 1990s. Country coverage and data sources are 
detailed in Table 1. A random effects model is estimated. In our robustness tests, we confirm 
the validity of our results by, including time dummies, among other things. 
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Table 1.  Source and Host Country Coverage and Sub-Periods






Panel B:  List of Host Countries














Panel C:  Sub-periods




Panel D:  Data Sources
Variables: Source:
Import of Goods Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF
FDI Inflows International Direct Investment Database, OECD
Equity Flows CrossBorder Analysis, Baring Securities
Unit Value of Manufactured Exports World Economic Outlook, IMF
Population International Financial Statistics, IMF 
GDP World Development Indicators, World Bank
Distance Shang Jin Wei's Website:  www.nber.org/~wei
Bilateral Telephone Traffic
Direction of Traffic:  Trends in International Telephone 
Tariffs, International Telecommunications Union
Export Concentration Index
Handbook of international trade and development 
statistics(2000/1 edition  CD-ROM), UNCTAD
Host Debt-Equity Ratio Worldscope
Host Creditor Rights
La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; and 
Shleifer, Andrei (1998).    - 21 - 
 
A.1  Baseline Results  
Table 2 presents the baseline results for goods trade, FDI and FPI.
14 For FDI, we specify the 
association with goods trade by dividing  the investment inflows from a source into each host 
country with the goods imports from the same source country. Our dependent variable, 
therefore, is the log of the FDI to imports ratio. The available FPI flows variable is a measure 
of gross transactions by residents of country A in the equity markets of country B (see Portes 
and Rey (2000), who first used this variable).
15 Once again, we take into account the possible 
association with goods trade by dividing the FPI flows with goods imports and by taking the 
logarithm of the ratio.
16 Larger country populations and per capita incomes increase import 
volumes.  Host country population size and per capita incomes do not have a significant 
further effect on FDI and FPI—the coefficients for these variables in FDI/trade and FPI/trade 
equations are statistically insignificant. In contrast, larger source populations are associated 
with more FDI and FPI relative to trade. And, increased source per capita incomes result in a 
large increase in FDI relative to trade. A possible interpretation for this last finding is that a 
greater knowledge gap and/or access to deeper financial markets, proxied by differences in 
per capita income spurs FDI. 
 
                                                 
14 As expected, the results for the goods trade are in line with the literature. See, for instance, 
Eaton and Tamura (1994), and Eichengreen and Irwin (1998). 
15 Interestingly, the effects of distance on the volumes of FDI and FPI can be seen in Table 4. 
16 See subsection IV C.1 where the goods trade variable appears as an explicit explanatory 
variable in the FDI and FPI equations.   - 22 - 
 
Table 2.  Gravity Equations for Goods Trade, FDI and Equity Flows
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 )
Host Population 0.742 0.883 0.417 0.279 0.995 0.857
   (3.98)**    (5.29)** (1.52) (1.14)    (3.09)**    (2.32)*
Source Population 0.976 0.976 0.793 0.791 0.983 0.988
   (13.25)**    (13.24)**    (3.04)**    (3.02)**    (3.49)**    (3.56)**
Host GDP Per Capita 0.643 0.725 -0.881 -1.105 1.630 1.215
(2.05)* (2.38)* (1.17) (1.63) (1.72) (1.12)
Source GDP Per Capita 0.914 0.889 5.150 5.163 1.230 1.222
   (3.99)**    (3.89)**    (6.47)**    (6.51)** (1.43) (1.44)
Distance -0.742 -0.747 0.513 0.503 1.088 1.074
   (11.89)**    (11.99)**  (2.40)*  (2.37)*    (5.81)**    (5.78)**
Instrumented Telephone Traffic 0.544 0.526 2.468 2.407 6.355 6.294
(1.88) (1.82)  (2.46)*  (2.42)*    (4.46)**    (4.46)**
Source Export Concentration 4.192 4.092 55.032 55.387 5.285 6.072
(0.77) (0.75)    (2.86)**    (2.88)** (0.25) (0.29)
(Source GDP) X 
   (Source Export Concentration) -0.163 -0.137 -9.778 -9.831 -2.539 -2.636
(0.20) (0.17)    (3.38)**    (3.39)** (0.81) (0.85)
Host Debt-Equity Ratio 0.000 0.002 -0.010 -0.019 -0.007 -0.011
(0.05) (0.73) (1.47)    (2.84)** (0.86) (1.15)
Host Creditor Rights 0.581 -0.676 -0.505
   (3.62)**    (3.27)** (1.54)
Constant 1.558 -0.480 -29.332 -25.710 -47.756 -44.241
(0.75) (0.22)    (4.18)**    (3.63)**    (5.38)**    (4.87)**
Number of Observations 324 324 324 324 207 207
R2 Within 0.884 0.884 0.155 0.154 0.285 0.286
R2 Between 0.413 0.587 0.245 0.490 0.375 0.507
R2 Overall 0.583 0.697 0.187 0.297 0.315 0.392
Note: Values of t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5 percent;  ** significant at 1 percent.
Imports of Goods FDI/Trade Equity/Trade
 
 
The coefficient of the distance variable is negative in the goods trade equation, as expected. 
This may also explain why the distance variable has a positive coefficient in the FDI and FPI 
equations. Recall that the dependent variables in these equations are, respectively, the ratio of 
FDI flows to goods trade and FPI flows to goods trade.
17 Finally, our telephone traffic 
variable, which proxies for the communications capability between the host and source 
                                                 
17 The effect of distance on the volumes of FDI and FPI flows can be seen in Table 4.   - 23 - 
 
countries, is extremely important in the FDI and FPI equations, suggesting that both FDI and 
FPI enhanced by the availability of communications.
18 
 
Consider, then, the new variables that we include in the gravity equations that our theory 
suggests. Creditor rights in the host country has a positive and significant sign in the goods 
trade equation, implying that better creditor rights enhance goods trade by improving the 
transparency of the importers/borrowers and by providing greater security for the credit 
transactions that normally accompany goods trade.  In sharp contrast, the host-country 
creditors’ rights variable enters with a negative and significant sign in the FDI equation. This 
is consistent with an important prediction of our model. Where creditors’ rights are weak, the 
ability of domestic lenders and investors to form informed judgments about the value of a 
company is likely to be circumscribed. In such a situation, foreign investors with their 
specialized knowledge and internal sources of funding will enjoy a unique advantage. 
Similarly, the other measure of host-country transparency, a high debt-equity ratio reduces 
FDI. In contrast, FPI flows are not significantly influenced by creditor rights or by the debt-
equity ratio. To wit, that our model makes no prediction about the relationship between host-
country transparency and FPI flows.
19. 
                                                 
18 Portes and Rey (2000) also used a telephone traffic variable in their estimations.  However, 
traffic is likely to be endogenous and, as we discuss in Loungani, Mody, and Razin (2002), 
consideration of that endogeneity is important to assessing the relative influences of physical 
and “informational” distance. 
19 However, a micro-data based study by Gelos and Wei (2002) finds evidence that 
international funds (an analogue of our FPI) invests less in less transparent countries; they 
use their own measure of transparency. This finding may also be interpreted as evidence for 
home bias in portfolio investment.   - 24 - 
 
 
Finally, higher source country specialization has a significant positive influence on FDI. This 
is consistent with another important prediction of our model, that source-country 
specialization yields advantage in eliciting good FDI opportunities in the host country. Note, 
however, that the term that interacts source country specialization and source country GDP is 
negative. A possible interpretation of this finding is that the advantage of specialization is 
mitigated as the size of the source country increases. It appears that for a given degree of 
specialization, as size increases, domestic (in the source country) direct investment 
opportunities hold back foreign investment. 
 
C.2. Robustness   
How robust are these results? We begin with three alternative specifications (Table 3).  First, 
there may be some time-specific effects. This is relevant in general but more so because the 
data for FPI flows is available for only two time points, whereas for FDI it is available for 
three time points in the 1990s. We thus added time dummies to the baseline equations, with 
the rest of the specification as before. The results remain unchanged. Second, the debt-equity 
ratio variable used in the estimations could have two problems. It could be measured with    - 25 - 
 
Table 3.  Gravity Equations for FDI and Equity Flows
( 1 ) ( 2 )  1/ ( 3)  2/ ( 4 ) ( 5 )  2/ ( 6 )  3/
Host Population 0.382 0.341 -0.017 0.922 0.946 0.485
(1.52) (1.36) (-0.09)  (2.18)*    (2.70)** (2.14)*
Source Population 0.805 0.777 0.801 1.008 0.996 0.917
   (3.08)**     (2.94)**    (2.63)**    (3.65)**    (3.56)**    (2.80)**
Host GDP Per Capita -0.498 -1.079 -0.741 1.643 1.318 1.881
(0.66) (1.56) (-1.82) (1.19) (1.28)    (5.04)**
Source GDP Per Capita 5.711 5.215 5.614 1.433 1.313 1.263
   (6.72)**     (6.50)**     (6.18)** (1.64) (1.53) (1.35)
Distance 0.619 0.571 0.856 1.118 1.104 1.369
   (2.80)**     (2.68)**     (3.79)**    (5.85)**     (5.93)**     (7.21)**
Instrumented Telephone Traffic 2.941 2.670 2.754 6.637 6.499 5.943
   (2.84)**     (2.66)**  (2.54)*    (4.60)**     (4.58)**     (3.87)**
Source Export Concentration 57.175 53.308 53.388 6.542 5.789 2.553
   (2.97)**     (2.74)**  (2.40)* (0.32) (0.28) (0.10)
(Source GDP) X 
   (Source Export Concentration) -10.306 -9.602 -10.843 -2.798 -2.633 -3.430
   (3.55)**     (3.28)**     (-3.23)** (0.91) (0.84) (-0.94)
Host Debt-Equity Ratio -0.019 -0.010 -0.023 -0.012 0.001 -0.018
   (2.89)** (0.74)     (-6.40)** (1.13) (0.09)     (-5.60)**
Host Creditor Rights -0.639 -0.299 -0.497 -0.196
   (3.07)**     (-2.59)** (1.31) (-1.92)
Dummy for 1993-1995  4/ -0.359 -0.185
(-1.51) (0.95)
Dummy for 1996-1998 -0.462 .
(-1.74) .
Constant -31.769 -30.561 -30.321 -47.585 -48.058 -45.149
   (-4.04)**    (4.34)**     (-3.90)**    (4.78)**    (5.37)**     (-4.92)**
Number of Observations 324 324 270 207 207 175
R2 Within 0.167 0.154 0.183 0.288 0.287 0.299
R2 Between 0.267 0.197 0.799 0.530 0.356 0.843
R2 Overall 0.202 0.168 0.405 0.407 0.289 0.546
1/  Regression with fitted value of Host Debt-Equity ratio.
2/  Regression with fitted value of Trade.
3/  The time period for for Equity/Trade regression is actually 1994-1996.
4/  Values of t-statistics in parentheses;  * significant at 5 percent;  ** significant at 1 percent.
FDI/Trade Equity/Trade
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 error,  because it is not based on consistently chosen sample of firms across countries and 
over time. There may also be reverse causation if FDI and FPI flows have a bearing on the 
domestic debt-equity ratios. We therefore instrumented the debt-equity ratio using the La 
Porta et al (2000) measure of creditors’ rights.
20 The results remain robust. Finally, we used a 
fitted value of goods trade in our dependent variables, the ratios FDI/Trade and Equity/Trade, 
using as an instrument a measure of restrictions on the current account.  Again the results 
remain robust.
21   
 
In Table 4, we further examine the robustness of the specification of the functional forms of 
the FDI and FPI equations. Instead of looking at the ratios of FDI and FPI flows to goods 
trade flows, as dependent variables, we consider now the FDI and FPI flows themselves, as 
dependent variables. The goods trade flows are now taken as an independent variable. The 
results regarding the unique variables of our model—transparency and specialization—
essentially do not change. Note also that the informational distance (as proxied by the 
negative of instrumental telephone traffic) has a negative and significant effect on FDI and 
FPI, but a statistically insignificant effect on goods trade (see Columns (1) and (2) of Table 
                                                 
20 The Host Debt-Equity Ratio fitted values were calculated after running the regression with: 
Host GDP Per Capita, Host Creditor Rights, and Host Country dummies.   
 
21 For the fitted values of goods trade, we run the basic gravity equation for imports of goods 
plus the current account restriction.  So, the explanatory variables are:  Host Population, 
Source Population, Host GDP Per Capita, Source GDP Per Capita, Distance, Instrumented 
Telephone Traffic, Source Export Concentration, Interaction between Export Concentration 
and Source GDP, Host Debt-Equity Ratio and Current Account Restriction. The Current 
Account Restriction measure is the Dennis Quinn Measure of Current Account Restriction. It 
is based on a 0-8 Scale with higher number indicating less restriction. Finally, instead of 
normalizing FDI and Equity by Trade, we also estimated equations without the normalization 
and included trade as a right-hand side variable.  The likely endogeneity problems here are 
severe; but our results of interest do not change.   - 27 - 
 
2). The goods trade variable has a positive and significant effect on the volume of FDI (but 
not on the volume of FPI). This may suggest the existence of some sort of  vertical FDI. 
Table 4.  Gravity Equations for Inward FDI and FPI Flows 
 FDI  FPI 

































































































Number of observations  324  324  207  207 
 
   Note: t-statistics are in parentheses; * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
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V.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We develop a model in which foreign direct investors are better equipped, due to rich 
experience in the skimming of  “good” firms than their direct domestic and portfolio 
counterparts. Employing this advantage, foreign direct investors are able to outbid direct 
domestic and portfolio investors for the good firms. We emphasize this feature of FDI, which 
is better hands-on management standards, that entails a cutting-edge advantage over portfolio 
investors in reacting in real time to a changing business environment. This feature is 
naturally more pronounced in high-productivity firms, resulting in “cream-skimming” of 
domestic firms by FDI investors. Note that this mechanism applies both to mergers and 
acquisitions and to green-field investments. The productivity signal, though, is likely to be 
coarser in the latter, conveying less information about the true productivity. This makes the 
FDI investors’ advantage over their domestic direct investors counterparts even more 
pronounced in the case of green-field investment. 
 
We view FDI as distinct from FPI investment with respect to the quality of monitoring the 
management. Foreign direct investors, by definition, acquire some significant control over 
the firm they invest in, whereas portfolio investors, plagued by free-rider problems, have no 
control. Consequently, they can apply hands-on management (or micro-management) 
standards that would enable them to react in real time to changing economic environments. 
This feature may stem from “intangible capital” accumulated through a specialization by the   - 29 - 
 
foreign direct investors in a certain niche.
22 Indeed, there is some micro evidence in support 
of our theory. For example, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) report that foreign direct investors 
pick the high-productivity firms in transition economies. Similarly, Griffith and Simpson 
(2003) find that foreign-owned manufacturing establishments in Britain, over the period 1980 to 
1996, have significantly higher labor productivity than those that remain under domestic 
ownership. In addition, labor productivity improves faster over time and faster with age in foreign-
owned establishments. 
 
To bring the model to the data we employ the gravity-equation approach. Indeed, we find 
that the abundance of “intangible” capital in specialized industries in the source countries (as 
proxied by export commodity concentration, shown also to mirror outward FDI industry 
specialization) is positively correlated with FDI flows to the host countries. Also, the degree 
of corporate transparency (as proxied by creditor rights and debt-equity ratio), in the host 
countries, is negatively correlated with FDI flows. 
 
 
                                                 
22 See Gopinath (2001) for a different application of a search model for a study of FDI flows 
into developing economies.    30  APPENDIX I 
 
Table 1.  Macroeconomic Determinants of Domestic Investment 
 
  OLS   TSLS   



































Long-Run Effect of Foreign Direct Investment  0.76**    0.68**   
Long-Run Effect of L  0.82**    0.35**   
Long-Run Effect of P  0.12*    0.53*   
 
Notes: 
   1.  Except for GNP growth rates, all other variables are measured as percentages of GNP. 
   2.  Sources: Razin (forthcoming). 
   3.  The second column of coefficients (TSLS) reports the estimation of one equation of a 
four-equation system; other endogenous variables are FDI, L, and P. 
   4.  A double asterisk stands for statistical significance (at the one-percent level). 
   5.  A single asterisk stands for statistical insignificance (at the five-percent level).    31  APPENDIX I 
 
  
Table 2.  Macroeconomic Determinants of GDP Growth 
 
  OLS   TSLS   








































Long-Run Effect of FDI  0.10**    0.23**   
Long-Run Effect of L  0.01*    0.01*   




1.  Except for GNP growth rates, all other variables are measured as percentages of GNP. 
2.  Sources: Razin (forthcoming). 
3.  The second column of coefficients (TSLS) reports the estimation of one equation of a 
four-equation system; other endogenous variables are FDI, L, and P. 
4.  A double asterisk stands for statistical significance (at the one-percent level). 
5.  A single asterisk stands for statistical insignificance (at the five-percent level).    32   APPENDIX II 
 
Appendix A: A Specialization Measure 
Our measure of specialization estimates the extent of concentration in a country’s export 
composition. In this appendix, we bring evidence that specialization in a certain export 
industry is indeed associated with specialization in outward foreign direct investment in that 
sector. Using information on 239 sectors, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 




















      H i  = the value of the concentration index of country-i. 
      E ij  = the value of exports/imports between country-j and country-i. 






Underlying the empirical approach adopted in this paper is the presumption that 
countries that specialize in particular sectors develop intangible capital in those sectors and 
such capital is then leveraged to invest abroad.  A question of some empirical interest then is 
whether the specialization that we observe in exporting activities is mirrored also in FDI 
activities.  In verifying if this is the case, we are restricted by the limitation of refinement in 
sectoral breakdowns available for FDI data. We were able to allocate activities into twelve 
comparable categories for exports and FDI for four major countries. The twelve categories 
are: agriculture, chemical products, construction, extraction of petroleum and gas, financial 
services, food products, machinery and transport equipment, mining and quarrying (without 
fuel), other manufactured goods, residual services, telecommunications, and total transport.    33   APPENDIX II 
 
The four countries are: France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 
question of interest then is: do the distributions of exports match the distribution of outward 
FDI across these 12 categories. 
 
In Table B1 below, we use two measures to judge how close these two distributions are. 
First, we use an informal approach. We obtain the absolute value of the difference between 
the share of sector i’s exports in total exports and the share of the same sector in the FDI 
originating from a source country.  We then average these differences over the 11 sectors.  
Note that this average can vary between 0 and approximately 20 percent.  It would be zero if 
there is perfect congruence in the sectoral distributions. It would be about 20, if one set of 
sectors had zero share in one of the distributions and the set of all other sectors had zero 
share in the other distribution.  The table shows that the average difference between sectoral 
shares has varied between 6 and 11 percent.  It has been at the lower end for Germany and 
France and at the higher end for the United States.  For a more formal test of the differences 
in distributions, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirinov statistic, which is based on extreme 
differences between the two distributions. The results show that the null hypothesis that the 
two distributions are the same is almost never rejected. 
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   1985-1988  8.67 6.44 6.52  11.12
   1989-1993  7.54 8.20 9.29  10.20
   1994-1998  11.00 10.01 9.02  10.11
  
Average Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
   Test P-value 
 
   1985-1988  0.64 0.58 0.56  0.39
   1989-1993  0.86 0.56 0.51  0.58
   1994-1998  0.61 0.27 0.87  0.85
 
   









i i F E F  share of sector i in outward FDI; Ei  = 
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